

Handling and Supervision of Stowaways on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86

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ABSTRACT

The rapid development of the national and international maritime world has raised many aspects that must be considered in the maritime sector, including ship security. In response, the international maritime community established the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, a regulation aimed at ensuring that ships remain in a secure condition in order to prevent threats to ship security. This study aims to determine the handling and supervision of stowaways, as well as the risks posed by their presence, on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86. A qualitative descriptive method was used, with data collected through observation, interviews, and documentation from primary and secondary sources. The results indicate that stowaways create various risks and problems for both the shipping company and the ship, including the loss of passengers' property, fire hazards, threats to the safety of passengers and crew, reduced passenger confidence, and departure delays. In addition, ship delays frequently occur due to suboptimal passenger services during embarkation and disembarkation. Therefore, closer cooperation between the ship and port security is needed to strengthen the supervision and handling of stowaways and to ensure compliance with the ISPS Code.



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1. INTRODUCTION

The development of science and modern technology, as well as the rapid development of the national and international maritime world, demands greater attention to seaworthiness, ship safety, and maritime environmental security (Faridah & Fajarwati, 2022). Security threats at sea, such as theft, smuggling, illegal immigrants and stowaways, piracy, sabotage, and terrorism, have prompted the international maritime community to establish international security regulations (Abdillah et al., 2023; Azhim et al., 2024). These regulations emerged after the attack on the World Trade Center in the United States on September 11, 2001, which triggered efforts by countries to improve security, including in the maritime sector.

One such regulation is the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which is designed to ensure that ships are in a state of security readiness to prevent threats to ship security (International Maritime Organization, 2003). Improving the quality of security on board requires knowledge and skills to address these issues; therefore, implementing the ISPS

Code on ships and in ports is crucial for improving maritime security coordination (Pranyoto & Kundori, 2022). Crews are required not only to possess safety skills but also to understand ship security, including threats such as bomb threats, piracy, terrorism, drug smuggling, illegal immigration, stowaways, and theft (Dewa Gede et al., 2025).

Under the ISPS Code, every ship to which the Code applies must implement a ship security plan that specifies measures for three security levels, appoint a ship security officer, and carry out security activities such as controlling access to the ship, controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects, and monitoring restricted and deck areas (International Maritime Organization, 2003). These activities are the first line of defense against unauthorized persons boarding the ship, including stowaways.

In international guidance, a stowaway is defined as a person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner, the master, or any other responsible person, and who is detected on board after the ship has departed from a port. The guidance allocates responsibilities to ships, port facilities, and public authorities and emphasizes that preventing access is preferable to resolving stowaway cases after departure (International Maritime Organization, 2018). On domestic passenger ships in Indonesia, the term is commonly applied to persons who board and travel without a valid ticket, which links stowaway prevention closely to ticketing and passenger embarkation procedures.

Stowaways remain a persistent problem for passenger ships. Studies of Ro-Pax vessels show that gaps between formal port-access rules and their practical implementation allow stowaways to board, posing risks to the ship, its crew, and the stowaways themselves (González Almeida et al., 2022; González-Almeida et al., 2026). In Indonesia, passenger overcapacity has been shown to be strongly related to stowaway incidents on passenger ships (Syafitri et al., 2026). To avoid the dangers posed by stowaways, all crew members must be more prepared and assertive in conducting supervision, especially during embarkation and disembarkation. Accordingly, this study examines the handling and supervision of stowaways on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 with the aim of optimizing supervision and minimizing losses for both the company and passengers.

Despite the attention given to maritime security in general, studies that describe how stowaways are actually detected, handled, and sanctioned on board Indonesian passenger ships remain limited, and most available studies focus on port authorities or on overcapacity rather than on the routine practices of the ship's crew. This study therefore contributes a crew-level description of supervision practices, the risks that stowaways create, and the role of passenger service during embarkation and disembarkation.

2. METHODS

2.1. Research Approach

This research uses a qualitative descriptive method, which aims to examine real-world problems through in-depth data collection from the research subjects, which are then processed and analyzed. A qualitative approach facilitates the researchers' understanding of the research subjects and of the phenomena that occur in everyday life (Annasthasya et al., 2025).

2.2. Research Location and Subjects

The research was conducted on board KM Sabuk Nusantara 86, a ship that provides passenger and inter-island cargo transportation services, during the authors' sea practice in Palembang, South Sumatra. The research subjects included:

- a. **The master**, who is fully responsible for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, and cargo during the voyage, oversees all ship operations, maintains order on board, and ensures compliance with shipping regulations.
- b. **The chief officer**, who assists the master in navigation, cargo supervision, and ship safety, and is responsible for safety equipment, watch schedules, and supervision of the deck crew at sea and in port.
- c. **The helmsman**, who steers the ship as directed by the officer of the watch or the master, assists with navigational duties, and maintains the cleanliness of the deck area.
- d. **The chief engineer**, who is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and repair of the ship's engines.
- e. **The engineers**, who assist in operating and maintaining the engines, carry out routine checks, and repair engine damage.
- f. **The bosun**, who supervises and organizes the work of the deck crew, including maintenance, cleaning, and loading and unloading, in accordance with the officers' instructions.

2.3. Data Collection Techniques

Data were collected to obtain accurate and factual information using the following techniques:

- a. **Interviews**: the authors conducted direct question-and-answer sessions with the master, officers, and crew members involved in passenger and stowaway supervision.
- b. **Observation**: during the authors' practice period on board, observations were made of ticket checks, passenger embarkation and disembarkation, the handling of stowaways, and coordination with port authorities.

c. Documentation: ship documents and records related to passengers and stowaway incidents were examined.

d. Literature study: relevant scientific references were used to strengthen the theoretical basis and as comparative material in discussing the handling and supervision of stowaways.

2.4. Data Analysis Techniques

The data were analyzed using a qualitative descriptive method, which included grouping, managing, selecting, compiling, and examining data patterns through the following stages:

a. Data collection: information was gathered using interview and observation guidelines and other supporting tools.

b. Data reduction: the data were summarized and selected according to the aspects most relevant to the research problem.

c. Data presentation: the data were presented systematically in the form of brief descriptions so that they are easy to understand.

d. Conclusion drawing: conclusions were drawn from the data analysis and verified against the field findings.

2.5. Validity and Reliability

a. Source triangulation: data obtained from interviews, observation, and documentation involving several informants with different positions were compared.

b. Data verification: the researchers re-checked the interview results and observation notes to ensure that the data were accurate and free from misinterpretation.

c. Member check: interim findings were conveyed back to several informants to ensure that the information corresponded to their actual experiences.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The data obtained through interviews, observations, and documentation were analyzed to identify how stowaways are handled and supervised on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86, the risks they pose, and the passenger service during embarkation and disembarkation. The readiness and competence of the crew are central to this effort, as human resource management determines the effectiveness of organizational operations (Faizah et al., 2025; Kencana, 2022).

3.1. Handling and Supervision of Stowaways on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86

Frequent problems on passenger ships include theft, alcohol smuggling, and stowaways, which have caused unrest among passengers and crew on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86. The ship's efforts to combat stowaways include providing information (socialization) to prospective

passengers. Passengers found without valid tickets are subject to a penalty of double the ticket price, and firm action is taken against ticket scalpers, who contribute to the presence of stowaways on board. These measures are in line with the international guidelines on preventing access by stowaways, which call for cooperation between ships, port facilities, and authorities (International Maritime Organization, 2018). The steps taken to handle and monitor stowaways are as follows:

a) Checking tickets when the ship is berthed. When the ship is berthed, the ship coordinates with shore authorities such as the police and the Indonesian National Armed Forces to provide security and supervision during ticket checks at the port before passengers board, and the ship's crew also participates in checking the tickets of boarding passengers. Such coordination with port authorities, including the harbor master, is essential for passenger safety (Sindy, 2024).

b) Checking tickets while the ship is sailing. Ticket checks on board during the voyage are carried out by off-duty deck officers, stewards, cadets, and the ship's security guards, who check all passengers and the spaces usually used as hiding places, such as lifeboats, cargo spaces, and the top deck.

c) Imposing strict sanctions. Upon arrival at the destination port, the crew in charge of handling and monitoring must impose sanctions on stowaways in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations. The sanctions applied on board include paying double the normal ticket price, disembarkation at the next port, and handover to shore security for further legal action. The master's decision-making in such situations must be firm and well informed (Pribadi et al., 2024).

The sequence of supervision and handling measures applied on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 is summarized in Figure 1. Supervision begins before passengers board, continues at the gangway during embarkation and throughout the voyage, and ends with the imposition of sanctions and the handover of stowaways to shore security at the destination port. Each stage involves different personnel, so the effectiveness of the whole sequence depends on clear division of tasks and communication between the ship and the port.




Figure 1. Stages of stowaway supervision and handling on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86

Supervision by the relevant authorities is also important. Studies of the Transportation Office’s supervisory function show that consistent supervision and enforcement are needed to curb illegal transport practices and maintain service order (Nurkhalik & Habibie, 2025; Shintya et al., 2022).

The measures observed on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 are consistent with the international guidance on preventing access by stowaways, which places the main emphasis on controlling access to the ship in port and on searching the ship before departure, so that stowaways are found while they can still be disembarked ashore (International Maritime Organization, 2018). Studies of Ro-Pax vessels similarly show that stowaways usually exploit gaps between formal access rules and their implementation at the gangway (González Almeida et al., 2022; González-Almeida et al., 2026). On KM Sabuk Nusantara 86, the ticket check during the voyage functions as a second line of defense when access control at the port fails.

The handling of stowaways on board involves several parties with different responsibilities, as summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Parties involved in stowaway supervision and their roles

Party	Role in supervision and handling
Master	Holds overall responsibility for order on board and decides on the sanctions imposed on stowaways
Deck crew at the gangway	Participate in ticket checks of boarding passengers while the ship is berthed
Off-duty deck officers, stewards, cadets, and ship security guards	Check passengers’ tickets during the voyage and search spaces used as hiding places
Police and Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)	Provide security and supervision during ticket checks at the port before boarding
Shore security at the destination port	Receive stowaways handed over by the ship for further action

These practices correspond to the ship security activities required under the ISPS Code, which include controlling access to the ship, controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects, and monitoring deck areas and restricted areas (International Maritime Organization, 2003). On KM Sabuk Nusantara 86, access control at the gangway and the search of lifeboats, cargo spaces, and the top deck are the most directly related to these requirements. Implementing them consistently, rather than only when overcrowding occurs, is important because gaps in supervision are most likely to occur when the crew is busy with embarkation, disembarkation, and cargo handling.

3.2. Risks Posed by Stowaways on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86

A stowaway is a person who secretly boards a ship without the knowledge of the crew, which can pose risks to both property and human life (González-Almeida et al., 2026). The risks posed by stowaways on board are as follows:

- a. Material risk:** money and valuables belonging to passengers may be lost or stolen while they are sleeping or in the bathroom; such thefts usually affect passengers in economy class or first-class cabins.
- b. Accident risk:** stowaways may cause a fire on board, for example by carelessly starting a fire.
- c. Risk to life:** stowaways may do unexpected things, such as threatening or assaulting passengers or crew.
- d. Moral risk:** the company and the ship may suffer from passengers' lack of confidence in the safety of the ship, while the carrier remains responsible for providing safe passenger facilities on board (Pattipawaej et al., 2022).
- e. Delay risk:** the ship may be delayed because shore officers and the crew must disembark the stowaways before departure.

Table 1 summarizes these risks, their consequences for the ship and the company, and the controls that address them.

Table 1. Risks posed by stowaways and corresponding supervision measures

Type of risk	Consequence	Supervision or handling measure
Material risk	Loss or theft of passengers' money and valuables	Ticket checks during the voyage; patrols of passenger areas
Accident risk	Fire caused by careless use of fire	Searches of hiding places such as lifeboats, cargo spaces, and the top deck
Risk to life	Threats or assaults on passengers and crew	Coordination with the police and TNI; handover to shore security
Moral risk	Reduced passenger confidence in the ship and the company	Socialization to passengers; firm action against ticket scalpers
Delay risk	Departure delayed while stowaways are disembarked	Ticket checks at the port before boarding; orderly embarkation

Table 1 shows that most of the risks can be reduced by measures taken before departure, particularly ticket checks at the port and controlled embarkation. This finding is in line with evidence from Indonesian passenger ships that overcapacity and weak access control during embarkation are closely related to stowaway incidents (Syafitri et al., 2026; Vania et al., 2026). Preventing stowaways from boarding is therefore more effective, and less costly for the company, than detecting them after the ship has sailed.

3.3. Passenger Service During Embarkation and Disembarkation on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86

During embarkation and disembarkation, each port must establish passenger embarkation and disembarkation rules to ensure orderly passenger movement. When the ship is berthed, the ship and the port communicate with each other regarding the passengers embarking and disembarking. After berthing, the crew and port authorities work together to ensure that passengers disembark without rushing, and passengers are advised to exercise caution to prevent incidents. Weak access control and identity verification during embarkation have been identified as key security problems on Indonesian passenger ships (Vania et al., 2026).

To provide good service, teamwork is paramount. Coordination with the embarkation point before opening the ship's doors is essential to avoid inconvenience. The ship's doors should not be left open, the gangway should not be lowered, and the embarkation gates should not be opened prematurely, because this can lead to a build-up of passengers in front of the gangway and on the quay. Improving the quality of passenger services in this way also supports overall public transport service quality (Fatimah et al., 2026).

3.4. Strategies for Strengthening Stowaway Supervision

Based on the findings, several strategies can be proposed to strengthen the supervision and handling of stowaways on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86. These strategies build on the measures already applied by the ship and connect them with the requirements of the ISPS Code and the international guidance on stowaways, as summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Proposed strategies for strengthening stowaway supervision

Stage	Proposed strategy	Responsible party
Before boarding	Verify tickets against passenger identity at a single controlled entry point and limit ticket sales to the permitted passenger capacity	Port operator, ship's agent, police and TNI
Embarkation	Open the gate and lower the gangway only when the crew and port security are in position; record the number of passengers who board	Chief officer, deck crew, port security
Before departure	Carry out a systematic stowaway search of lifeboats, cargo spaces, the top deck, and other hiding places using a checklist	Ship security officer, bosun, deck crew
During the voyage	Conduct ticket checks at scheduled times and at random, and record every case found	Off-duty officers, stewards, cadets, ship security guards
At the destination port	Report each case to the port authority and hand stowaways over to shore security in an orderly manner	Master, port authority, shore security
Continuous	Brief and drill the crew on stowaway procedures as part of ship security training, and review recorded cases periodically	Master, ship security officer, company

Table 3 places the greatest weight on measures taken before the ship departs, because a stowaway found in port can be removed without delaying the voyage or exposing passengers and crew to the risks described in Section 3.2. A pre-departure search using a checklist gives the crew a consistent routine that does not depend on individual initiative, while recording each case provides the information needed to evaluate whether the measures are effective. These strategies are consistent with the emphasis on access control and searches before departure in the international guidance (International Maritime Organization, 2018) and with the finding that weak identity verification during embarkation is a key security problem on Indonesian passenger ships (Vania et al., 2026).

The strategies also depend on cooperation between the ship and the port. Ticket sales, gate control, and the presence of police and TNI personnel are largely managed ashore, while searches and ticket checks during the voyage are the responsibility of the crew. Without clear communication between the two, gaps can arise at the point where responsibility passes from

the port to the ship. Regular coordination meetings between the ship, the port operator, and the harbor master, as well as the exchange of passenger numbers before departure, would help close these gaps (Sindy, 2024; Faridah & Fajarwati, 2022).

This study has limitations. It was carried out on one ship during the authors' sea practice and relied on qualitative data from interviews, observation, and documentation; the number of stowaway incidents and the length of the resulting delays were not measured. The findings therefore describe the supervision practices on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 rather than the frequency of stowaway cases, and further research on several passenger ships could quantify how supervision measures affect the number of incidents and departure delays.

4. CONCLUSION

Based on the research results, it can be concluded that operational delays on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 were influenced by the presence of stowaways and by suboptimal passenger service during embarkation and disembarkation. A lack of supervision and handling of stowaways can lead to various risks and losses for both the company and the ship. Therefore, good cooperation is needed between port security and the ship to improve supervision, handling, and passenger arrangements so that ship operations can run more safely, orderly, and efficiently.

Supervision on KM Sabuk Nusantara 86 is carried out at several stages, from ticket checks at the port and during embarkation to checks during the voyage and sanctions at the destination port, and is most effective when stowaways are prevented from boarding in the first place. It is recommended that the ship adopt a pre-departure stowaway search checklist, record every stowaway case, and integrate stowaway procedures into regular ship security briefings and drills, while the port tightens ticket verification and controls passenger capacity. Future studies could compare several passenger ships and measure the number of stowaway cases and the resulting delays to evaluate the effect of these measures.

5. DECLARATIONS

Author contributions: I.K.H.P.A.: Conceptualization, Supervision, Writing – review & editing; R.P.S.: Methodology, Validation; N.J.A.: Investigation, Data curation, Writing – original draft. All authors take responsibility for the content of the final manuscript.

Conflict of interest: The authors are not aware of any conflict of interest affecting this study.

AI usage statement: This article was written entirely by the authors; generative AI was not used for drafting, translation, or analysis.

Ethical approval: The master, officers, and crew members interviewed participated voluntarily. Records of stowaway incidents were used without the names or identities of the persons involved.

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Data availability: Observation notes and interview summaries can be requested from the corresponding author; ship records concerning passengers and stowaways are confidential and are not shared.

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